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This paper presents two different approaches on the basis how to generate constituencies. The first one 
is based on cluster analysis by means of which approach can get compact constituencies having an 
approximately equal number of voters. An optimal number of constituencies can be obtained by using 
this method. The second approach is based on partitioning the country into several areas with respect 
to territorial integrity of bigger administrative units. The units obtained in this way will represent 
constituencies which do not necessarily have to have an approximately equal number of voters. Each 
constituency is associated with a number of representatives that is proportional to its number of voters, 
so the problem is reduced to the integer approximation problem. Finally, these two approaches are 
combined and applied on the Republic of Croatia. 
 





According to the current Act on Elections of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (Narodne 
novine 116/99, 109/00, 53/03, 69/03-Revised text, 167/03, 44/06, 19/07, 20/09, 145/2010), the 
Republic of Croatia is divided into ten multi-member electoral districts with a proportional electoral 
system. Fourteen representatives are elected in each district from the electoral lists. Article 36 in the 





aforementioned Act reads: “Constituency is determined by the Act on constituencies for the election of 
representatives to the Croatian Parliament (Narodne novine 116/99) so that the number of voters in 
constituencies must not vary by more than ±5%. When defining constituency, the Act established the 
area of districts, cities, and municipalities established by the Act must be taken into account as much 
as possible.” 








Deviation from the 
average number of 
voters 
ሺ തܳ ൌ 382473.1ሻ 




Deviation from the 
average number of 
voters 
ሺ തܳ ൌ 382436.3ሻ 
100 ܳ௝ െ തܳതܳ % 
I 361.236 -5.55 358.750 -6.19 
II 399.648 4.49 403.716 5.56 
III 366.005 -4.31 346.332 -9.44 
IV 335.091 -12.39 333.927 -12.68 
V 372.163 -2.70 367.654 -3.86 
VI 356.575 -6.77 352.471 -7.84 
VII 403.812 5.58 413.148 8.03 
VIII 385.594 0.82 358.376 0.76 
IX 428.590 12.06 440.597 15.21 
X 416.017 8.77 422.392 10.45 
 
Table 1 show the number of voters for each constituency in the election years 2007 and 2011. The 
above data clearly show that there were significantly larger variances in parliamentary elections in 
2007 and 2011 than those permitted by the law. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia 
warned about this phenomenon in late 2010.  
The problem of determining constituencies continues to be a topic of interest in the scientific and 
technical literature, where one can find algorithms to generate the distribution of constituencies based 
on various heuristic approaches (Bozkaya et al., 2003; Grilli, 1999; Ricca et al., 2008a,b). 
In this paper, we intend to present two different approaches known in the literature, based on which it 
is possible to generate constituencies. The first approach, given in detail in (Sabo et al., 2012), is based 
on cluster analysis and presents a modified form of the model (Hess et al., 1965). On the basis of this 
model, it is possible to generate an optimal electoral constituency that has the property of equally 
distributing the number of voters among constituencies. In doing so, legally prescribed rules under 
which the constituencies should have approximately the same number of voters are respected. 
Furthermore, only geographically close territorial units will enter a constituency.  
The second approach is based on the division of the country into several natural units with respect to 
the territorial integrity of counties. Natural units obtained in this way will represent constituencies, 





which do not necessarily have to have an approximately equal number of voters. Each constituency is 
associated with a number of seats that is proportional to the number of voters in that unit, and the 
problem is reduced to the integer approximation problem. This approach is known as the 
“Apportionment Methods” (Grilli et al., 1999). 
These two approaches can be combined such that first the application of cluster analysis is used to 
determine an appropriate number of constituencies which have a nearly equal number of voters. Next, 
the optimal constituencies obtained in this way are then approximated to the nearest natural areas 
which respect the integrity of the counties, and the number of representatives is determined for each of 
them on the basis of the Apportionment Methods. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a mathematical model (Sabo et al., 2012) based on 
cluster analysis is described together with the algorithm for solving it. Determination of the 
appropriate number of constituencies in the Republic of Croatia is particularly considered. In Section 3 
a brief overview of Apportionment Methods is given. In Section 4 results of the two approaches in the 
particular example referring to the Republic of Croatia are illustrated.  
2. METHOD FOR DETERMINING CONSTITUENCIES WITH APPROXIMATELY 
EQUAL NUMBERS OF VOTERS  
 
Generally, we consider the area of a state organized in m territorial units (cities or districts), which are 
determined by their geographical location in the so-called Gauss-Krüger coordinate system by the 
points ܽ௜ ൌ ሺݔ௜, ݕ௜ሻ, ݅ ൌ 1, … , ݉. Furthermore, we assume that territorial unit ܽ௜ has ݍ௜ voters, and 
that the total number of voters ܳ is specified by ∑ ݍ௜ ൌ ܳ௠௜ୀଵ . We want to share the territory of the 
country into ݇, ሺ1 ൏ ݇ ൏ ݉ሻ constituencies ߨଵ, … , ߨ௞, each having the corresponding number of 
voters ܳଵ, … , ܳ௞, so that: (i) each constituency consists of the territorial units (cities and districts) that 
are close to each other, which is determined using some distance measure; (ii) the requirement of the 
first paragraph of Article 36 in the Act on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament 
(Narodne novine, 116/99) is satisfied. 
The proximity requirement of territorial units of a constituency may be provided by applying cluster 
analysis using appropriate distance-like function ݀: Թଶ ൈ Թଶ ՜ ሾ0, ൅∞ۄ (see e.g. Kogan, 2007). The 





so-called least square (LS) distance-like function1 ݀ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ԡݔ െ ݕԡଶ is commonly used in various 
applications because it is simple and intuitive. Hence, we will use this metric function hereinafter. 
We will consider the mathematical model described in (Sabo et al. 2012) where both criteria (i) and 
(ii) are satisfied. In order to improve the model, it is possible to take into account some other criteria 
that ensure additional conditions of uniformity, such as: Socio-economic homogeneity (Bourjolly, 
1981; Bozkaya et al., 2003), Similarity with the existing structure of constituencies (Bozkaya et al., 
2003), Area similarity (Bozkaya et al., 2003), Keeping major territorial units (e.g. counties). 
Assume that the number of voters in the two constituencies must not differ by more than p%. It is not 
hard to show that in this case the number of voters ܳ௝ in any constituency must not differ from the 
average number of voters per constituency  ொ௞  for more than ݌Ԣ ൌ
ଵ଴଴௣
ଶ଴଴ା௣ % (see Sabo et al., 2012). 
We will associate every constituency ߨଵ, … , ߨ௞ with its corresponding center ܿଵ, … , ܿ௞. If we use the 
LS-distance-like function according to (Chen and Peng, 2008) and (Teboulle, 2007) the problem of 
determining optimal constituencies is reduced to the following optimization problem: 
 










with the following conditions: 
 














݇ ൑ ෍ ݓ௜௝ݍ௜
௠
௜ୀଵ
൑ ቆ1 ൅ ݌Ԣ100ቇ
ܳ
݇  (4) 
 ݓ௜௝ א ሼ0,1ሽ, ݅ ൌ 1, … , ݉, ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇. (5) 
Condition (2) ensures that each territorial unit ܽ௜ belongs to precisely one constituency ߨ௝, condition 
(3) ensures that the voters of every territorial unit are included in some general constituency, condition 
                                                 
1 LS-distance like-function is defined as the square of ordinary Euclidean distance. In this case, the center of 
constituency is represented by the point (“centroid, center of gravity”) which has the property that the sum of 
the squared distances to their territorial units is minimal. 





(4) ensures the uniformity of the number of voters per constituency for the most p'%, and condition (5) 
ensures that each territorial unit ܽ௜ belongs entirely to only one constituency. 
If we assume there is a town or a municipality with population ݍ௜బ, which is more than p'% higher 
than the average size of constituencies, i.e., for whose population ݍ௜బ we have 





then optimization problem (1) with conditions (2) - (5) does not have a solution. In that case, we must 
allow that such territorial unit splits in more than one constituency. This is achieved by imposing 
index set ܫ଴ of those territorial units to which (6) applies, and instead of conditions (5), the following 
condition is introduced 
 ݓ௜௝ ൌ ൜ሾ0,1ሿ, ݅ א ܫ଴ሼ0,1ሽ, ݅ א ሼ1, … , ݉ሽ ך ܫ଴ , ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇. (7) 
Optimization problem (1) with conditions (2) - (5) and (7) is a nonlinear global optimization problem 
with restrictions (Floudas and Gounaris, 2009), with a very large number of variables, and a lot of 
potential local solutions. Direct solving of this problem is extremely demanding from the numerical 
aspect. Instead of solving this global optimization problem, motivated by the work of (Ng, 2000), in 
(Sabo et al., 2012) we have constructed an iterative algorithm that provides a locally optimal solution 
by using a good initial approximation2. 
Assuming that we launched the algorithm from (Sabo et al., 2012) with a good initial center 
approximation ܿଵ, … , ܿ௞, we can claim that the result of algorithm execution provided locally optimal 
centers of constituencies ܿଵכ, … , ܿ௞כ . The constituency has been defined with ߨ௝כ ൌ ൛ܽ௜ א ࣛ: ݓ௜௝כ ്
0,   ݆ൌ1, …, ݇. It should be noted that two possibilities can occur for ܽ݅אߨ݆כ: if ݓ݆݅כൌ1, then the 
territorial unit ܽ௜ is contained entirely in the constituency ߨ௝כ; if ݓ௜௝כ  is a number between 0 and 1, then 
the constituency ߨ௝כ contains the ݓ௜௝כ th part of the territorial unit ܽ௜ (this option will occur only if 
݅ א ܫ଴, where ܫ଴ is the index set of those territorial units for which (6) applies). 
According to (Leisch, 2006), our iterative procedure is initiated with e.g. 1000 different randomly 
generated initial centers, and the one that gives the smallest value of cost function (1) is taken as a 
                                                 
2 It takes 5 minutes to implement Algorithm 1, which involves determining the initial approximation based on 
data for the Republic of Croatia with 10 constituencies, on the computer with an Intel Core i5 760 processor 
and 8GB of RAM. Routines from the GNU Linear Programming Kit (GLPK) library 
(http://www.gnu.org/s/glpk) are used for linear and integer programming. 





solution. Unfortunately there isn’t any guarantee that this solution is global, but we can believe that it 
is optimal with high probability. 
 
3. APPORTIONMENT METHODS 
 
Assume that an electoral system consists of ݇ א Գ constituencies. The total number of seats S should 
be apportioned among these ݇ electoral districts, so that a number of seats ݏ௝ which belongs to the 
constituency ݆ ሺ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇ሻ is determined according to the number of voters ܳ௝ in that constituency, 
in such a way that ݏ௝ is “most proportional” to ܳ௝, for all ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇. Thus, for given S seats, ݇ 
constituencies and the corresponding vector of voters Q ൌ ሺܳଵ, … , ܳ௞ሻ, where the total number of 
voters is ܳ ൌ ∑ ܳ௝௞௝ୀଵ , the apportionment problem is to determine the k – tuple ݏ ൌ ሺݏଵ, … , ݏ௞ሻ such 
that there exists a degree of proportionality between the number of seats ݏ௝ and the number of voters 
ݍ௝, for all constituencies ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇, where ∑ ݏ௝ ൌ ܵ, ݏ௝ א Գ.௞௝ୀଵ  
Different proportional electoral methods may be used for apportionment of seats to constituencies 
according to their number of voters and they depend on different measures of proportionality (Grilli et 
al., 1999, Marošević et al., 2007). 
Proportional electoral formulas can be classified into two groups: quotient methods and divisor 
methods. Quotient methods are based on quotients, i.e. quotas ݖ௝ allocated to each constituency:  
උݖ௝ඏ ൑ ݏ௝ ൑ ඃݖ௝ඇ,          ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇. 
In quotient methods apportionment of seats to constituencies according to the number of their voters is 
done considering integer parts of quotas, and then the remaining seats are apportioned to those districts 
which have largest remainders. 
Well-known quotient methods are given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Quotient methods and their quotas 
Quotient Method Quota 
Largest Remainders method (Hamilton method) (natural quota)  ݖ௝ ൌ ொೕொ · ܵ 
method of Droop quota ݖ௝ ൌ ܳ௝ܳ · ሺܵ ൅ 1ሻ 
method of Imperiali quota ݖ௝ ൌ ܳ௝ܳ · ሺܵ ൅ 2ሻ 





Divisor methods are determined by their increasing sequence of divisors ݀ሺ0ሻ  ൏  ݀ሺ1ሻ  ൏  ݀ሺ2ሻ  ൏
 . . .  ൏  ݀ሺܵ– 1ሻ. For each constituency ݆ and every divisor one computes the ratio between the 




݀ሺ1ሻ ൐ ڮ ൐
ܳ௝
݀ሺܵ െ 1ሻ,          ׊݆ ൌ 1, … , ݇. 
Then ܵ seats are apportioned to those constituencies which have the ܵ largest ratios. 
Well-known divisor methods are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Divisor methods and their divisors 
Divisor method Divisors 
Smallest Divisors (i.e. Adams method) ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ ݉ ሺ0, 1, 2, … ሻ 
Danish ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ 1 ൅ 3݉  ሺ1, 4, 7, … ሻ 
Harmonic Mean ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ 2݉ሺ݉ ൅ 1ሻ2݉ ൅ 1 ሺ0, ൎ 1.33, 2.4, … ሻ 
Equal Proportions (i.e. Huntington method) ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ ඥ݉ሺ݉ ൅ 1ሻ  ሺ0, ൎ 1.41, … ሻ 
Sainte-Laguë (i.e. Webster method) ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ 1 ൅ 2݉  1, 3, 5, … ሻ 
modified Sainte-Laguë (1.4, 3, 5, 7, ...) 
d’Hondt (i.e. Jefferson method) ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ ݉ ൅ 1  ሺ1, 2, 3, … ሻ 
Belgian ݀ሺ݉ሻ ൌ 1 ൅ ݉2 ሺ1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, … ሻ 
 
In connection with the case of “dividing by zero”, let us note that if some divisor method has ݀ሺ0ሻ  ൌ
 0 (as for methods: Smallest Divisors, Harmonic Mean and Equal Proportions), then by that method 
each constituency gets one seat in advance, regardless of their number of voters ܳ௝ ሺ݆ ൌ 1, . . . , ݇ሻ. 
4. CONSTITUENCIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
4.1. Determination of constituencies with approximately equal numbers of voters 
 
The area of the Republic of Croatia is organized into ݉ ൌ 556 territorial units (cities or districts). We 
would like to divide the Croatian territory into ݇, ሺ1 ൏ ݇ ൏ ݉ሻ constituencies. The number of voters 
per constituencies must not differ from each other by more than 5%, i.e., condition (6) with ݌Ԣ ൌ ଵ଴଴ସଵ  
must be satisfied see (Sabo et al., 2012). At the same time, we assume that the number of 
constituencies ݇ ranges from 2 to 10. For example if we suppose that the number of constituencies is 
10, on the basis of model described in Section 2 the optimal division of Croatian territory shown in 





Figure 1. Here, each territorial unit belongs to exactly one constituency, except the city of Zagreb, 
which has to be divided between constituencies I (56.3%), II (42.7%), and VII (1%). 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the Croatian territory into ݇ ൌ 10 constituencies. 
 
The question naturally arises as to how many constituencies would be most appropriate for the current 
geopolitical status of Republic of Croatia. In other words, how many constituencies should there be, 
and how should they be configurated, such that the compactness of territory is secured, where we need 
to keep the uniformity of the number of voters per constituencies as it is predicted by the mathematical 
model.  
Automatically determining the number of clusters has been one of the most difficult problems in data 
clustering processes. In some cases, the number of clusters in a partition is determined by the nature of 
the problem itself. If the number of clusters in a partition is not given in advance, then it is natural to 
search for an optimal partition which consists of clusters that are as compact and relatively strongly 
separated as possible. 
The literature attempts to answer this question by using various indices such as the Davies-Bouldin 
index, Calinski-Harabasz index, or the decrease rate of the cost function (Kogan, 2007; Sabo et al., 
2010; Gan et al., 2007). It also makes sense to minimize the number of constituencies that need to 
share the largest territorial unit - the city of Zagreb. It is usually necessary to combine all indices, and 
choose a number that indicates the highest index number for the number of constituencies. A higher 
value of the Calinski-Harabasz index corresponds to a more appropriate number of constituencies. 
Figure 2a shows that, according to this criterion, we should take 5, 6, 9, or 10 for the number of 
constituencies. If we look at the value of the cost function (Figure 2b), we see that its rate of decrease 
is significantly higher up to to 5 and 6 constituencies and then it “flattens” out, meaning that according 





to this criterion, an appropriate number of constituencies was 5 or 6. We are also going to reduce the 
division of city of Zagreb by using 5 or 6 constituencies (Figure 2c).  
 
a) Calinski-Harabasz index 
depending on the number of 
constituencies 
b) Cost function values 
depending on the number of 
constituencies 
c) Number of constituencies the 
city of Zagreb is divided into 
depending on the total number of 
constituencies 
 
Figure 2: The values of different indices, depending on the number of constituencies. 
 
The application of these indices to the problem of determining the optimal number of constituencies in 
the Republic of Croatia indicates that the appropriate number of constituencies should be 5, in case we 
do not want to divide the city of Zagreb, or 6, if we allow its division. Figure 3 shows the division of 
Croatia into 5 and 6 constituencies. The black dots denote geographic centers of each cluster 
(constituency). 
 
 ݇ ൌ 5 constituencies ݇ ൌ 6 constituencies 
 









4.2. Application of the Apportionment Methods 
 
In the previous subsection, we concluded that the optimal number of constituencies in the Republic of 
Croatia is 5 or 6. Suppose that the Croatian territory is divided into five constituencies, but such that 
the integrity of the counties is preserved. It makes sense to generate a constituency in the way that the 
areas resulting from Subsection 4.1 are approximated with fairly similar areas, while preserving the 
integrity of the counties. In this way, we obtain a constituency as shown in Table 3 and Figure 5. 
 
Table 4: Constituencies that preserve the integrity of counties, obtained by approximating constituencies from 
Subsection 4.1. 
Constituency County The number of voters on 
the basis of data used for 
the 2012 Census 
Constituency I City of Zagreb, Zagreb County  1,013,125 








Constituency IV Karlovac, Primorje-Gorski Kotar, 
Lika-Senj, Istria 
677,313 





Let us consider the problem of proportional apportionment of seats to constituencies for the data from 
the previous Table 4, on the basis of the given number of voters ܳ௝, in the constituencies ݆ ൌ 1, … , 5. 
In this way, we have the total number of seats ܵ ൌ 140, ݇ ൌ 5 constituencies, with the corresponding 
number of voters  ܳ௝ given in the third column. We have applied 11 proportional electoral methods 
mentioned in Section 3 for apportionment of seats to these five constituencies, and obtained the same 
results, independently of which proportional electoral method was used. It is the following 
apportionment of seats to electoral districts: 
ݏଵ ൌ 35, ݏଶ ൌ 26, ݏଷ ൌ 27, ݏସ ൌ 23, ݏହ ൌ 29 
 
So, we can conclude that this apportionment indisputably represent proportional apportionment of 
seats to five electoral districts according to the number of their voters for the data from the previous 
Table 4. 






Figure 4: Constituencies from Table 4 with the corresponding number of representatives, obtained by applying 
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